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CRIMINAL LAW-LAWS WHICH
PROHIBIT CONSENTING ADULTS FROM
PARTICIPATING IN HOMOSEXUAL
ACTIVITIES IN PRIVATE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The twentieth century has witnessed something of a revolution in
what is commonly referred to as morality. Morality may be generally
defined as a set of customs and standards in a community which delineate anticipated or acceptable conduct' The greater the consensus within
the community as to what these standards are, the greater will be
compliance with them in actual practice. In many instances certain of
these standards have been deemed essential in many societies, and as a
result, have been codified and formalized. Once given the force of law,
these select standards become rules of conduct which demand compliance. Behind these laws is the authority of the governing body and often
the threat of punishment to those who fail to comply. When the community consensus as to what is or ought to be a particular community
standard deteriorates, those whose views diverge from what was the
original standard no longer tend to comply. Sometimes the change in
community attitudes is so pervasive that it effectuates a change in the
standard itself. When this type of situation develops, it is not unusual
for a law which reflects the former standard to be repealed. Perhaps
our society is in the midst of one of these periods of change. There are
growing groups within our community which urge that certain laws
reflecting standards which no longer represent or enjoy adequate support from the community consensus be repealed. 2 More important,
there are some who argue that it-is-not-the business of the law to enforce
morality purely for morality's own sake in any instance. 3
II.

A.

PUNISHMENT OF THE HOMOSEXUAL

CriminalSanctions
One area of the legal enforcement of morality which has spawned

1. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 7-8, 43-47 (1st ed. 1961).
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 5-9 (rev. ed. 1969).
2. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 132 (rev. ed. 1969).
3. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 4 (1963).
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great controversy is the area of victimless sex crimes: fornication, sodomy, homosexual acts, and other so-called unnatural sexual acts. In
recent years the controversy over laws which make punishable homosexual acts between consenting adults in private has grown to such
proportions that it now demands the public's attention.
The State of South Carolina has a crime known as "buggery" 4
which makes certain acts punishable as a felony without making allowance for private, consentual acts.5 Black's Law Dictionary defines buggery as "a carnal copulation against nature; a man or a woman with
a brute beast, a man with a man, or man unnaturally with a woman." 6
How and when this law has been enforced in South Carolina is something of an enigma since there is apparently no case law interpreting
or applying it.
B. Sanctions Outside the CriminalLaw
Laws which make these consensual homosexual acts illegal, criminal, and punishable are not the only sanctions placed upon those who
may participate in these acts. The homosexual who is employed by the
government may be and has been subjected to a different threat. Since
many government agencies either control or participate directly in the
hiring and firing of their personnel, they constitute a considerable
threat to the job security of the homosexual employee. Generally, Congress or the state legislative body will limit the authority of the agencies
in this area in order to prevent arbitrary decisions, and to ensure that
due process is afforded all employees and applicants.7 One common
limitation on the power of dismissal is the requirement that the agency
or board show good cause before an employee may be dismissed.' Two
recent cases are good examples of agency actions aimed at the dismissal
of employees who had allegedly engaged in homosexual activities.9
In 1969 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit had the occasion to review the case of Norton v.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Educ.,

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-412 (1962).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11 (1962).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 243 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
Orloffv. Los Angeles Turf Club, 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227 P.2d 449 (1951).
Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Morrison v. State Bd. of
I Cal. 3d 214,461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
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Macy."0 The appellant, who had been a budget analyst for the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (N.A.S.A.), and another man,
Procter, were arrested by morals squad officers of the District of Columbia police force for a traffic violation. At the morals office both men
were questioned extensively as to any activities between them and as
to their sexual histories. A N.A.S.A. security official, Chief Fugle, was
contacted and fully appraised of the results of the interrogation at
which the appellant consistently denied having made any sexual advances towards Procter. Appellant then went with Fugler to a N.A.S.A.
office where Fugler and another security officer questioned the appellant further. During this interrogation, the appellant admitted that he
had engaged in some homosexual acts while in high school and in
college. He also allegedly admitted to having periods of blackout after
drinking during which he suspected he had engaged in homosexual acts.
Appellant further admitted that he had experienced a blackout when
he met Procter. Upon this evidence, N.A.S.A. determined that the
appellant had in fact made homosexual advances toward Procter, and
added further that the act was "immoral, indecent, and disgraceful
conduct."'" N.A.S.A. also decided to dismiss the appellant on the
grounds that he possessed "traits of character and personality which
render [him] . . . unsuitable for further Government employment. "' '
This determination was upheld by a Civil Service Appeals Examiner
and the Board of Appeals and Review. After the federal district court
turned down his request for reinstatement, the appellant proceeded to
the Circuit Court for relief.
Chief Judge Bazelon, speaking for the court, noted that the appellant was a veteran and "could be dismissed only for 'such cause as will
promote the efficiency of the service.' "' The court then held that the
appellant was unlawfully discharged since there was nothing in the
record to suggest "any reasonable connection between the evidence
against him and the efficiency of the service .

. . .""

Bazelon unhesi-

tatingly attacked the Civil Service Commission for deeming itself the
judge of the morality of an employee's off-duty conduct. He stressed
10.
I1.
12.
13.
14.

417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Id.at 1163.See5C.F.R. § 731.201(b),(g)(1969).
Id.
Id. at 1162. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 7512(a) (Supp. 1968).
Id.
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that when the Commission simply labels an employee's acts as immoral, it is discouraging "careful analysis because it unavoidably connotes a violation of divine, Olympian, or otherwise universal standards
of rectitude."' 5 Bazelon admitted that the Commission could possibly
have found that the appellant's homosexual advances were immoral
"under dominant conventional norms," 16 but he stated that it is not
within the authority of the federal bureaucracy to enforce community
standards of morality in the private lives of its employees. Bazelon then
turned to the question of the appellant's performance as an employee
and whether there was evidence present indicating that his homosexual
activities adversely affected his efficiency. Bazelon pointed out that
there was substantial evidence that appellant was dismissed according
to a "custom within the agency' 17 and in order to avoid any embarrassment to the agency in the future. He admitted that embarrassment
to the agency could hinder the appellant's efficiency in the service, but
alleged that such a claim could easily be employed by the agency as a
"smokescreen hiding personal antipathies or moral judg."18 In the appellant's case, Bazelon indicated that the
ments ..
claim of possible embarrassment to the agency was an unreasonable
grounds for dismissal.
In light of Chief Judge Bazelon's opinion, it is apparent that the
action taken by N.A.S.A. and the Civil Service Commission in the
Norton case was something other than administrative in nature. In
reality, the agency and the Commission were exercising a power to
punish under a guise of administrative authority to promote efficiency
in the service, and this is what Judge Bazelon finds so objectionable.
A situation somewhat similar to the Norton case arose in
Morrison v. State Board of Education" which was reviewed by the

Supreme Court of California. In that case, the appellant, a former
school teacher of exceptional children, was- appealing a determination
by the California State Board of Education that he was unfit to teach
and no longer entitled to a teaching diploma. The board had based its
decision on facts which indicated that the appellant and a fellow male
15. Id. at 1165.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.

Id. at 1167 (emphasis added by court).
id.
1 Cal. 3d 214,461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
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teacher had engaged "in a limited, noncriminal physical relationship
which petitioner described as being of a homosexual nature" 2 on four
occasions within one week. Justice Tobriner, speaking for the court,
pointed out that California law does authorize the dismissal of a
teacher for any act involving moral turpitude. 2 But he stressed that the
authorizing statute would be unconstitutional if interpreted to give the
Board the power to dismiss teachers for no other reason than immoral
conduct. Tobriner submitted that the terms "'immoral or unprofessional conduct' or 'moral turpitude.'" are too broad for statutory
language since "they embrace an unlimited area of conduct.""2 He
assumed, however, that the legislature did not intend to give the board
the power to dismiss an employee simply because it disapproves his
private conduct. Therefore, Tobriner interpreted the legislature as
meaning that dismissal is in order only where the employee's private
conduct adversely affects his performance on the job. He concluded
that there was no evidence presented to show that appellant's private
conduct affected his performance.Y The case was, therefore, reversed
and remanded.
But what indeed was the intention of the legislature? In saving the
statute from being deemed unconstitutional for vagueness and violation
of due process, the court has failed to present any substantial evidence
to indicate the real legislative intent. Justice Tobriner assumes the
legislature intended a narrowing application since a literal and broad
interpretation would be unreasonable in that it would "subject to discipline virtually every teacher in the state."2 Perhaps Tobriner has
been too clement toward the legislature. It is likely that the legislature
indeed intended to subject to dismissal those teachers whose private
conduct might be deemed immoral by the Board. As in Norton v.
20. Id. at 218-19,461 P.2d at 377-78, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78 (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 217, 461 P.2d at 377, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 177. See Board of Educ. v. Swan,
41 Cal. 2d 546, 261 P.2d 261 (1953). For professionals, other than teachers, who are
licensed by the state see Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Yakov
v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 435 P.2d 533, 64 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1968);
Lorenz v. Bd. of Medical Examiners, 46 Cal. 2d 684, 298 P.2d 537 (1965).
22. Id. at 224-25, 461 P.2d at 382, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 182. See Hale v. Bd. of Educ.,
13 Ohio St. 2d 92, 234 N.E.2d 583 (1968); Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City School
Dist., 12 Ohio Misc. 288, 233 N.E.2d 143 (1967).
23. Id. at 236,461 P.2d 392, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
24. Id. at 225,461 P.2d at 382-83, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83.
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Macy,2' what results is not an exercise of administrative authority. The
revocation of the appellant's diploma to teach was more in the nature
of a purely punitive act than one taken to promote the efficiency of
teachers as a whole or to protect the public welfare. His diploma was
revoked simply because the State Board of Education disapproved of
his conduct.
Both of the above cases present the same general question. Where
do we strike a balance between the right of the individual to pursue his
private life without government interference and the government's interest in promoting the public welfare. Both cases were decided in favor
of the individual's rights since there was no showing that the dismissals
were aimed at promoting a valid public interest. The courts are hinting
that the enforcement of morality for its own sake is not so precious a
value as to outbalance the interest in preserving rights to privacy. This
line of reasoning may very well be applied to laws which make criminal
private homosexual acts between consenting adults. It follows then that
we should not label conduct which does not conform with community
standards of morality as criminal on that basis alone. There must be
some important public interest which necessitates the government's
proscription of such conduct before an invasion of this realm of indi26
vidual privacy may be justified.
III.

THE DEBATE OVER LAWS WHICH ENFORCE MORALITY

A noted advocate of laws which make private homosexual activity
illegal is Lord Justice Devlin. He submits that these crimes are not in
truth victimless, nor are the acts consensual. He names society as the
victim of these immoral acts and urges that society has not given its
consent to the performance of these acts. He feels that society has an
extremely important interest to protect in enforcing these morality
crimes. This interest is the preservation of society itself.2 Lord Devlin
explains:
There is disintegration when no common morality is observed and
history shows that the loosening of moral bonds is often the first
state of disintegration, so that society is justified in taking the
25. 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
26. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27. P.A. DHVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 12-13 (1965).
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same steps to preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its
government and other essential institutions. The suppression of
vice is as much the law's business as the suppression of subversive
activities; it is no more possible to define a sphere of private morality than it is to define one of private subversive activity.,

Addressing the question of homosexuality, Lord Devlin says there is a
"general abhorrence" 29 of it, that people consider it "so abominable
that its mere presence is an offence." 3 Lord Devlin concludes that,
given this public intolerance, society has the right to "eradicate it."' 31
H.L.A. Hart, Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Oxford and a strong opponent of laws which make consensual, private
homosexual acts criminal, answers Lord Devlin's argument in his book
Law, Liberty, and Morality.32 Professor Hart states that there is no
proof that allowing consenting adults to privately participate in homosexual activities will lead to the disintegration of society.? Hart perceives what he calls "an undiscussed assumption"' ' in Lord Devlin's
argument. He interprets Devlin to say that "those who deviate from
any part [of morality] are likely or perhaps bound to deviate from the
whole." 35 Hart argues that there is simply no evidence to justify this
assumption." Professor Hart is willing perhaps to agree that "some
shared morality" is essential for society's existence, but he is unwilling
to identify society with its morality as he alleges Lord Devlin does. If
we were to adopt Devlin's thesis, says Hart, society would be destroyed
everytime there is a change in morality.3Y Later in his book, Professor

Hart concedes that the views of Devlin, and others more extreme than
Devlin's, may have been applicable during the Victorian period in
England since at that time there was an overwhelming consensus within
society that immoral activities should be punished." But he insists that
modern public opinion is not so intolerant. Professor Hart then sug28. Id. at 13-14.

29. Id. at 17.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
H.L.A. HART, LAw, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
Id. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 50-5 1.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 52. But see P.A. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 13-14 n. (1965).
Id. at 62.
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gests that "a number of mutually tolerant moralities"39 may exist in
today's society. He is further willing to concede that there is "much
in social morality worth preserving even at the cost ' 40 which wil result
from enforcement. But Hart will not go as far as Devlin. Hart feels that
"essential universal values" 41 should be preserved, however, there may
be, and should be, "individual divergences in other fields" 4 from society's prevalent morality. He, therefore, submits that laws which make
criminal private homosexual activities between consenting individuals
are not longer essential or universal in their value, and should be repealed.
Professor Lon L. Fuller of Yale agrees with Hart that these laws
should be repealed, but he finds it unnecessary to address himself to
the question of whether or not homosexuality is immoral as such.
Instead, he determines, according to what he calls the "inner morality
of law," 43 that crimes prohibiting consensual homosexual acts in
private are not really functional as law.44 Professor Fuller explains:
The reason for this conclusion would be that any such law simply
cannot be enforced and its existence on the books would constitute
an open invitation to blackmail, so that there would be a gaping
discrepancy between the law as written and its enforcement in
5

practice.4

A close analysis of Professor Fuller's argument yields what is perhaps
the most compelling reason for abandoning the legal enforcement of
morality as applied to private, consensual acts. Is the enforcement
worth the cost in resources and human suffering which will result from
enforcement?
Assuming that uniform and consistent'enforcement is desirable,
an attempt to implement such enforcement would require either a diversion of law enforcement manpower from other areas of enforcement,
or the expenditure of sizeable funds to employ more enforcement officials, and perhaps the creation of a special agency. Besides the difficul39. Id. at 62-63.
40. Id. at 70.
41. Id. at 71.
42. Id.

43. See L. FULLER, Tm
44. Id. at 132-33.
45. Id. at 133.

MORALITY OF LAW

Ch. 2 (rev. ed. 1969).
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ties posed by inadequate numbers of enforcement personnel and insufficient funds to finance so mammoth a task, there are other imposing
problems in actually applying and administering these morality laws.
The most obvious of these problems stems from the fact that these
crimes are victimless. How do enforcement officials become informed
of violations of these laws when in fact they have been breached? Given
the private, consensual nature of the acts in question, it is unlikely that
enforcement officials will easily obtain knowledge of them. Certainly
there are instances where one of the consenting parties decides to reveal
what took place. He may have a change of heart and feel guilty, or he
may have a vindictive motive. Perhaps the act was not in fact private,
having been witnessed by some third person. But these examples do not
eliminate the multiple instances of acts which are never called to the
attention of law enforcement officials, and the second example takes
the acts out of the realm of privacy and presents the added consideration of offensiveness to a third person's concepts of decency. In such a
case, the crime would no longer be "victimless." 4 The only possible
solution would appear to be that hypothetical, extreme example of the
police state in which the acts of every man are monitored by eavesdropping devices located in every nook and cranny. Such a suggestion is
ludicrous since it conflicts so fundamentally with our modern concepts
of liberty and privacy. We simply do not prefer the uniform and efficient enforcement of such laws to the preservation of individual freedom.

47

IV.

CONCLUSION

Recent cases reveal a trend toward striking a balance in favor of
the individual doing as he pleases in private when no harm results to
others. The trend is away from allowing the government to interfere
with the individual's right to privacy in such cases. The trend relies on
an old thesis: one is free to do as he wishes without interference, so long
as he does no harm to others.48 In our modern society, government has
the authority to interfere with the individual's exercise of his rights. The
question presented is when should government exercise its power under
46. See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 44-45 (1963).
47. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
48. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY Ch. 1 (1859).
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this authority to interfere? The obvious answer is only when necessary
to prevent harm to other members of society. This simple line of reasoning is no less applicable today than it was in the day of John Stuart
Mill. Professor Hart claims to have refined it, but has actually restated
it within a modern context. 9 Since laws which make criminal private,
consensual homosexual acts between adults are, at best, of questionable
value to society's interest in self-preservation, they should be repealed
in deference to the individual's rights to do as he pleases in private.
GERALD

49. Supra Note 46, at 5-6.
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